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Among the announced candidates now in the running for the presidency in Nicaragua's October
1996 general elections are one current and two former Sandinista leaders. Another has longstanding
ties to the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza, which the Sandinistas overthrew in 1979, while yet
another is a former minister in the administration of President Violeta de Chamorro who defeated
the Sandinistas at the polls in 1990. Although the candidates are preparing to run, after months of
delay, the legislature is still holding up passage of new electoral laws.
There are now seven presidential candidates: former mayor of Managua Arnoldo Aleman of
the conservative Alianza Liberal; deputy Miriam Arguello of the conservative Alianza Popular
Conservadora (APC); ultra-conservative Virgilio Godoy of the Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI);
Antonio Lacayo, former minister of the presidency in the current administration, of the centrist
Proyecto Nacional; Daniel Ortega, general secretary of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional
(FSLN) and former president (1984-1990); former FSLN guerrilla leader Eden Pastora of the centerleft Movimiento de Accion Democratica (MAD); and Sergio Ramirez, former FSLN vice president,
running on the center-left ticket of the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS), which broke away
from the FSLN early this year.
Polls taken before either Pastora or Ortega announced their candidacies showed Aleman as the
favorite among voters who had already decided for whom they would vote. Aleman's popularity
with this group averaged 41% in various polls taken through early October (see NotiSur, 11/03/95).
When canvassed on party preference in late September by the CID-Gallup poll, prospective voters
ranked the Alianza first with 29% and the FSLN second with 24%. Though other polls showed
Aleman with as much as 55%, most political observers do not expect him or any other candidate to
receive the 45% required to win in the first- round election in October. In that case, a runoff must
be held between the two top vote-getters. The only party calling itself liberal that has not joined the
Alianza to support Aleman is Godoy's PLI. Some observers think that Godoy and perhaps Arguello
will eventually throw their support to Aleman, which could make a difference in the result, if not in
the first round, then certainly in the runoff.
Below the Alianza and the FSLN in the popularity standings, the other parties have been showing
single-digit percentages. Nevertheless, the likelihood that neither Ortega nor Aleman will win in
October gives the smaller parties an opportunity to affect the outcome of the runoff election and
the orientation of the next administration as the two surviving candidates bargain for their support.
Aleman and Ortega represent very different political positions, but the elections may well depend
on how much weight the more centrist candidates Lacayo, Pastora, and Ramirez can bring to bear
on the outcome. On Nov. 10, Daniel Ortega became a candidate, though he is not yet the official
nominee of the FSLN. Party chiefs picked him to run, but the official nomination will take place
at the party's grassroots primary in February and will then be ratified at the party congress next
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spring. Ortega has come forward after months of internal party indecision on whether to run a party
warhorse or to look for a candidate not identified with the FSLN who might attract the undecided
voters indicated by the polls to be around 35% of the electorate.
According to insiders, the nomination had previously been offered to at least two other people with
more moderate political images than Ortega's, but neither would accept. Carlos Guadamuz, director
of the Sandinista "Radio Ya," said the party was "knocking on doors, almost kissing the feet of
some people in the bourgeoisie," to find a candidate. The indecision reflects FSLN differences over
election strategy. With a well-organized party of over 300,000, the FSLN cannot afford to alienate
its followers but needs to expand its appeal to attract enough non-FSLN voters to overtake Aleman.
But according to Francisco Gonzalez, a local FSLN leader in Matagalpa, the party erred in the 1990
elections by concentrating too much on winning over the undecided voter and failed to hold all the
party's followers. This time party leaders say they are concentrating on party consolidation and the
mobilization of grassroots support against the current government's economic policies. For example,
party organizers are making appeals to campesinos and former contras, promising to answer their
demands for access to land and credit.
Responding to charges that the Sandinista government of the 1980s lost support partly because of its
lack of internal party democracy, the FSLN announced that it will hold open conventions permitting
grassroots involvement in candidate selection. The party has also adopted a requirement that at
least 30% of the candidates selected must be women and 10% must be youth. In an election in which
most of the presidential candidates are calling for moderation and centrist solutions to national
problems, Ortega is no exception. If elected, he said, he would build a government on national unity
and compromise. His government, he said, would not have a Sandinista name nor would offices
be monopolized by Sandinista leaders, but rather the government "would be open to everyone."
Though extremely critical of the Chamorro government's economic policies, the FSLN has yet to
offer a clear alternative (for an analysis of the FSLN, see NotiSur, 09/01/95).
Ortega's former vice president Sergio Ramirez is expected to draw votes from Ortega, but the
possibility exists that he might throw his support to the FSLN in a runoff. The status quo candidate
is Chamorro's former political right arm, Lacayo, who left the government in September to run
under the banner of the Proyecto Nacional despite the constitutional provision that prohibits
relatives of an incumbent president from running. Lacayo is President Chamorro's son-in-law but
is counting on the Supreme Court nullifying the prohibition before the official campaign season
opens (see NotiSur, 04/28/95). Lacayo launched the new party as an alternative to both the Somozatinged right and the Sandinista left. The Proyecto is clearly a government party, replacing the Union
Nacional Opositora (UNO), a loose grouping of 14 center-right elements that was organized to
support Chamorro in the 1990 election but had little to hold it together except an anti-Sandinista
theme.
With the clear support of the government and a recent endorsement by Chamorro, Lacayo's run for
the presidency, if he is allowed to make one, could become a vote of confidence on the neoliberal
economic policies, the controversial decision to compensate former Somocistas for property
expropriated during the Sandinista era, and other Chamorro policies (see NotiSur, 11/02/95). Indeed
it would be seen as a referendum on Lacayo's own performance in government as he was widely
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regarded as the power behind the president. Lacayo is offering himself as the sensible alternative
who can save the country from a new conflict between what he calls the extremists of the left
and right. "There are three principal political forces," said Lacayo, placing his fledgling Proyecto
between the Alianza right and the Sandinista left. "We believe that with [just the] two options we
were headed directly toward a new political confrontation."
Lacayo's low standing in the polls may indicate that voters do not see either Aleman or Ortega as
extremists nearly as much as they see the Chamorro government as a disappointment. Aleman
does not offer extreme solutions to the country's economic crisis. As mayor of the capital city, he
built a popular following on public works projects and political patronage. Though he has backing
from former Somocistas and former contras of the Partido de la Resistencia Nicaraguense (PRN),
Aleman's economic ideas seem to follow the neoliberal outlines of the Chamorro administration
(for an in-depth analysis of Aleman's candidacy, see NotiSur, 11/03/95). Aleman expects to receive
considerable support from the former contras, but they do not form a solid bloc committed to any
one candidate.
In early November, eight former contra leaders joined Lacayo's Proyecto Nacional and said that
others were also planning to join. The eight are former commanders on the general staff of the
Resistencia Nicaraguense (RN). In a letter requesting formal membership in the Alianza, they said,
"We are aware of the great advance of the past five years in Nicaragua in the areas of pacification,
reconciliation, and consolidation of democracy in general." But this high opinion of the current
administration is not shared by all former contras, who were never able to construct a unified
political force. The former contras have long been split along lines of rank, with many if not most of
the former contra soldiers critical of their former leaders for not helping them secure the postwar
assistance in the form of land and credits the government promised them. Some 10,000 RN members
refused to disarm after Chamorro took office in 1990 and opposed her administration because it did
not follow through on the postwar assistance.
Many other former contras joined former FSLN fighters in the farmers organization Union Nacional
de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UNAG) where they are being courted by Ortega. Immediately after
the eight former officers joined Lacayo's Proyecto, others in the PRN membership denied that the
eight represented their party. The leadership of the PRN said that the eight were rejected from the
PRN for "moral insolvency." The PRN is leaning toward throwing its support behind Aleman. But
the entry into the race on Nov. 5 of one-time Sandinista guerrilla leader and later contra leader Eden
Pastora, the charismatic Comandante Cero, could well draw off some contra votes from Aleman.
Promising to end "the same old policies" ("continuismo"), Pastora accepted the nomination of the
Movimiento de Accion Democratica (MAD), a center-left party he founded in 1992. Pastora said
that if elected he would lead a "moral revolution" against corruption, consciously invoking the
same theme used by Honduran President Carlos Roberto Reina. While he is against continuismo,
he supports major aspects of the current neoliberal economic model such as privatization of stateowned businesses and investment laws that give foreign capital the same rights as national capital.
Election analysts tend to regard Pastora as somewhat erratic and inconsistent but see his charismatic
personality as a plus in the upcoming campaign. Pastora became a revolutionary icon after the
assault he led in 1978 on the National Palace, where he and other FSLN guerrillas took several
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Somoza government officials hostage. In 1981, he broke with the FSLN, saying he objected to its
Marxist orientation. Though he subsequently fought against the Sandinista government, he never
allied himself with the Somocistas. In his pre-campaign pronouncements he seems to be positioning
himself in politics as he did in war between the revolutionary Sandinista left the Somocista right.
Meanwhile, as candidates enter the race, the legislature has yet to pass the new electoral laws that
are necessary to comply with constitutional amendments that emerged in July from the protracted
struggle between the executive and legislative branches (see NotiSur, 07/07/95).
On Oct.18, lawmakers approved a reform bill in principle but did not agree on all the particulars.
Among the most hotly debated provisions is one that would allow Nicaraguans living outside the
country to vote in the general elections. Others prohibit the use of campaign funds from foreign
countries and impose controls on campaign use of the media. The bill also includes an election
calendar restricting the campaigns for president and deputies in the national legislature and the
Parlamento Centroamericano (PARLACEN) to 75 days. Campaigns for local office would be limited
to 45 days.
Fearing that the delay in passing the law could set back the entire electoral process, on Oct.18 the
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) set the elections for Oct. 20, thus providing those government
officials who want to run for office a chance to resign their posts within the required 12 months
prior to election day. The schedule also permits a 45-day lapse between the first and second rounds,
leaving time for vote- counting and a recount if necessary before the seating of the new legislature
on Jan. 9 and the presidential inauguration on Jan. 10, 1997. As of mid-November, the legislature had
not finished debating the details of the electoral law. The president of the CSE, Mariano Fiallos, said
the delay could hurt the electoral process "because we do not know the rules of the game." (Sources:
Notimex, Reuter, 09/01/95; Greenleft News, 09/07/95; Agence France-Presse, 10/08/95, 10/14/95,
10/17/95, 10/19/95, 11/04/95, 11/05/95, 11/06/95, 11/09/95, 11/10/95; Agencia Centroamericana de
Noticias Spanish News Service, 10/19/95, 11/13/95; Nicanet, 10/23/95, 11/14/95)

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 4 of 4

